This paper characterizes how …rms'strategic interaction in product markets a¤ects the industry dynamics of investment and expected returns. Under imperfect product market competition, the investment strategy of each …rm depends on the intra-industry standard deviation in …rms' market to book ratios or intra-industry value spread. The insight by asset pricers that a …rm's exposure to systematic risk is signi…cantly related to its own investment is incomplete in industries with high value spread, in which a …rm's exposure to systematic risk is also explained by the investments of others. In the model and the data, …rms'betas and excess returns correlate more positively in industries with low value spread, low dispersion in operating mark-ups, and low concentration.
Introduction
In imperfectly competitive industries, the ability of …rms to a¤ect market prices induces them to invest strategically. The value of each …rm depends not only on its own assets in place and investment opportunities, but also on the ability of its competitors to expand capacity and a¤ect market prices. As a result, under imperfect competition, the insight by asset pricers that a …rms'exposure to systematic risk or beta is signi…cantly a¤ected by its own investment decisions is incomplete. When …rms invest strategically, a …rm's exposure to systematic risk may depend signi…cantly on the investments of other …rms in the same industry.
The production based asset pricing literature focuses on the impact of corporate investment on expected returns in perfectly competitive or perfectly monopolistic industries. 1 We explore the intermediate case of imperfectly competitive industries, in which …rms'strategic interaction a¤ects the dynamics of investment and risk. The study of …rms'intra-industry interactions is relevant in the light of the existing empirical evidence, which suggests that commonly studied asset pricing regularities are predominantly intra-industry. 2 Our model rationalizes existing …ndings on the cross section of returns, and provides additional testable predictions which we …nd support for in our empirical section.
We motivate our study with several research questions. How does a …rm's relative position in its product market in ‡uence its investment decisions, and the conditional dynamics of its expected returns? In which types of industries are the stylized predictions of investment based asset pricers for monopolies or perfectly competitive industries still appropriate? How does strategic interaction a¤ect the intra-industry correlation of …rms'investments and their exposure to systematic risk? And lastly, how do speci…c industry characteristics such as demand elasticity, demand growth or demand volatility a¤ect the industry dynamics of investment and risk?
The core prediction of our model is that the dynamics of …rms'investments and expected returns depend critically on the intra-industry standard deviation in market to book ratios, or intra-industry value spread. Under imperfect competition, a …rm's market to book ratio re ‡ects its comparative advantage to increase its market share. As a result, in industries with low value spread, …rms have more similar investment strategies, they invest at more similar points in time, and their betas and excess returns correlate more positively. The model also 1 See, for instance, Berk et al (1999) , Zhang (2005) and Carlson et al (2004) . 2 See, for instance, Cohen and Polk (1996) , Moskowitz and Grimblatt (1999), and Cohen et al (2003) .
predicts that …rms'betas and excess returns may correlate more positively in industries with low standard deviation in mark-ups, and low concentration. 3 We obtain these predictions in partial equilibrium, real options model of duopoly in which heterogeneous …rms compete in capacity, with costly production and irreversible investment.
We solve for the investment strategies of …rms that di¤er in either their production technologies, and have a single growth option to increase capacity. This represents a signi…cant departure from earlier dynamic models of imperfect competition, which focus on identical …rms and hence are silent about the intra-industry cross section of investments and risk. 4 Given that the setting is fairly complex, we spend substantial e¤ort in deriving …rms'investment strategies in equilibrium. We derive testable implications on the impact of …rms'strategic interaction on expected returns by examining their betas.
We group our contributions into three di¤erent sets of results. Our …rst set of results relates to the predictions of the model on the dynamics of investment under imperfect competition.
In neoclassical models, the investment of each …rm solely depends on its own marginal product of capital or q. 5 In contrast, we …nd that under imperfect competition the investment strategy of each …rm depends on the marginal product of capital or q of all …rms in the same industry.
In our model, a …rm's q re ‡ects its comparative advantage to increase its market share relative to other …rms in the industry. As a result, …rms'strategic behavior is such that the investment strategy of each …rm depends on the intra-industry standard deviation in q.
The corresponding testable implication is that …rms'investment strategies depend on the intra-industry value spread. In industries with low value spread, …rms are closer competitors with similar market to book ratios, and hence the cost of preempting each other by investing aggressively is too high. Firms' investment strategies are more similar: …rms increase their capacity by similar amounts, and their investments cluster. Conversely, in industries with high value spread, …rms are more distant competitors, and …rms with higher market to book invest earlier and more than their competitors.
Our second set of results relates to how …rms' strategic interaction a¤ects the dynamics of expected returns. Consistent with the predictions for monopolies discussed in Carlson et al (2004) , we …nd that under imperfect competition …rms undergo a period of high expected returns before their own investment, and a period of low expected returns upon investment. 3 We elaborate on the link between industry dynamics and these static measures of competition below. 4 See Weeds(2002) , Grenadier (2002) , and Aguerrevere (2009). 5 See, for instance, Hayashi (1982) .
Yet we add that, in industries with high value spread, …rms also undergo a period of low expected returns before their competitors invest. The insight that a …rm's exposure to systematic risk is signi…cantly related to its own investment is incomplete in industries with high value spread, and also in industries with low demand growth, low demand volatility, and high demand elasticity.
The model provides several empirical predictions on the relation between …rms'expected returns and market to book ratios. In the model, a …rm's market to book ratio re ‡ects its ability to increase its market share in subsequent periods. As a result, the market to book sorts used in the empirical asset pricing literature are e¤ectively aggregating …rms according to their relative position in the industry. 6 Similarly, we …nd that the dynamics of the expected returns of each …rm are a¤ected by the intra-industry value spread. This suggests why Cohen et al (2003) …nd that the value spread of US …rms is predominantly intra-industry.
The core testable asset pricing implication is that …rms'betas and excess returns correlate more positively in industries with low value spread. Firms' strategic interaction a¤ects the intra-industry correlation of their expected returns, even when all …rms in the industry are subject to no idiosyncratic shocks, and there is a single source of systematic risk. In industries with low value spread, …rms have similar investment dynamics, and their expected returns correlate positively over time. Conversely, in industries with high value spread, there are leaders which invest earlier and more than other …rms, and the betas of leaders and laggards correlate negatively over time.
The model also shows that those industries with low value spread usually have lower standard deviation in mark-ups, and lower concentration as measured by the Her…ndahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). This allows us to formulate testable predictions on how the spread in mark-ups and the concentration of an industry a¤ect the dynamics of expected returns. In particular, our testable implications on the HHI rationalize the recent evidence in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) . Consistent with our model, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) …nd that in less concentrated industries have more predictable average industry returns, in which periods of high market to book ratios, high returns, high betas and high investment, are followed by periods of lower market to book ratios, lower investment, lower returns and lower betas.
A related implication is yet that commonly used measures of competition such as the spread in mark-ups or the HHI may prove insu¢ cient to study industry dynamics, precisely 6 See Fama and French (1992) on market to book sorts. because they are static. In our model, industries with low HHI may have low intra-industry value spread, but this need not apply to all cases; for instance, a deconcentrating industry may have a high value spread, and a concentrating industry may have a lower value spread. 7 As a result, the key sorting variable to test for the impact of …rms' strategic interaction on industry dynamics is the intra-industry value spread. The intra-industry value spread is forward looking, and captures current and expected future di¤erences in mark-ups and market shares.
The third main contribution of our paper relies on its empirical evidence. We …rst document that …rms'investments are signi…cantly related to the intra-industry value spread, both at the …rm and industry level. To test our predictions on industry dynamics, we construct a measure of comovement which captures the average pairwise correlation in …rms'investments, betas and excess returns by industry. 8 Consistent with the underlying assumption that corporate investment a¤ects …rms' expected returns, we report a signi…cant relation between the intra-industry comovement in investment and the intra-industry comovement in betas or excess returns. More importantly, we report that betas and excess returns correlate more positively in industries with lower value spread, lower standard deviation in mark-ups, and lower concentration.
Finally, while we focus on a duopoly to derive all the testable implications of our paper, we provide an extension with three …rms to show that our testable implications remain as the number of …rms increases, and to explore how an increase in the number of …rms a¤ects …rms' values and betas in our model.
As in Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009), a higher number of …rms erodes the values and betas of all …rms in the industry. Yet in contrast with their studies which focus on identical …rms, we …nd that a higher number of …rms erodes more severely the betas of those …rms with lower q. Also, the stylized prediction in Grenadier (2002) that a higher number of …rms induces …rms to accelerate investment need not apply to all industries. In industries with high value spread, a higher number of …rms may induce …rms with lower q to delay their investment.
The paper is organized in four sections. Section 1 describes the basic model and its core predictions on investment and risk dynamics. Section 2 provides the testable implications of the basic model and related extensions. Section 3 reports the supporting empirical evidence.
Section 4 concludes.
7 See discussion in Section 2. 8 Our methodology follows Khanna and Thomas (2009) . See Section 3.
Related literature
The model relates closely to Carlson et al (2004) , who study the dynamics of …rms'exposure to systematic risk in a cross section of monopolistic …rms. We build on their framework to study how …rms'strategic interaction under imperfect competition a¤ects investment and expected returns. The model is related to Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) , Grenadier (1996 ), Weeds (2002 , and Mason and Weeds (2010) , whose studies focus on duopolies in which …rms only decide when to invest. Our solution approach with sorting conditions relates to Maskin and Tirole (1988) , and is consistent with the observation in Back and Paulsen (2009) that dynamic investment models of oligopoly should account for …rms'incentives to preempt each other.
The model also relates to Carlson et al (2012) and Bena and Garlappi (2012) , whose models of investment timing show that the beta of the leader is dampened by the expected reduction in pro…ts once the follower invests. We show that in industries with high value spread the beta of any operating …rm is dampened by the investments of its competitor. The theme of the paper is close to Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009). While they study how a …nite number of …rms in symmetric oligopolies a¤ects investment and betas, our focus is on the strategic interaction of heterogeneous …rms.
The asset pricing implications and empirical evidence in our paper relate closely to Cohen et al (2003) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010 Hou and Robinson (2006) , and Opp et al (2011) .
Basic model
We begin by studying the simplest type of industry which conveys the core predictions of our paper. We elaborate on the corresponding empirical implications in Section 2.
Main assumptions
We build on the framework by Carlson et al (2004) , and use their notation where possible.
We consider an industry with two …rms j = L; M . Each …rm has assets in place, and a single growth option to increase their capacity. Each …rm is all equity …nanced and run by a manager who is the single shareholder.
Firms compete in capacity and produce an homogeneous good which they sell in the market at a price p t . Firms operate at full capacity at any point in time. The demand function requires that the product market price p t equals
where " > 1 is the elasticity of demand and X t is a systematic multiplicative shock, and the industry output Y t is the sum of the production at time t. 9 The demand shock X t follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift x and volatility x such that
where z t is a standard Wiener process, and X 0 is strictly positive. 10
Managers maximize shareholder value by choosing when and how much to invest. Managers decide when to invest by determining the critical value x j for the stochastic demand shock X t at which the …rm exercises its growth option. They decide how much to invest by determining the optimal scale of production j > 1 upon investment. The resulting investment strategy is given by j fx j ; j g.
We assume that both …rms have the same initial installed capacity before investment K. 11
Firms increase their installed capacity from K to j K upon investment. We further set the output of each …rm j to be equal to its installed capacity, such that the total production Y t in (1) is the sum of the installed capacity of both …rms at any point in time. 12 The decision to invest is irreversible, and entails bene…ts and costs. 13 Upon investment, …rms bene…t from a lower instantaneous marginal cost of production. We assume that …rms have the same instantaneous marginal cost of production c before investment, and have lower 9 Firms under imperfect competition do not operate in the range where " < 1: 1 0 We further assume that X0 is su¢ ciently low such that the growth options of all …rms in the industry are strictly positive at time t = 0. Hence X0 < x s L in the basic model; we de…ne x s L in Section 1.3. 1 1 We relax this assumption in Section 2. 1 2 Hence Yt = 2K if both …rms have not invested, Yt = (1 + j ) K if one of the two …rms has invested, and Yt = ( L + F ) K if both …rms have invested.
1 3 The irreversibility of investment implies a commitment by …rms not to adjust their capacity upon a reduction in market prices.
and di¤erent marginal costs of production c j < c upon investment. We denote …rm L as the …rm with the lowest instantaneous marginal costs after investment, such that c L < c M .
Upon investment, …rms incur a …xed cost f K. We do not consider variable costs of investment for the sake of tractability; the qualitative predictions of the model remain unchanged if …rms are subject to linear cost of investment. 14 We also assume that the costs of production are linear in X t ; this allows us to compare more easily …rms'capacity choices in our model to those predicted by static games of strategic interaction.
Given all our assumptions, the instantaneous pro…ts of …rm j before its own investment jt are given by
where the superscript denotes the cash ‡ows before investment. The instantaneous pro…ts of …rm j after its own investment + jt are equal to
where the superscript + denotes the cash ‡ows after investment.
Valuation
The value of any …rm j at time t V jt equals the expected present value of its risky pro…ts.
Using a similar argument in Carlson et al (2004) , we assume that demand shocks are perfectly hedgeable, and determine the value of the …rm using a replicating portfolio with weights on a risk free and a risky asset.
We let B t denote the price of a riskless bond with dynamics dB t = rB t dt, and we let S t be a risky asset with dynamics dS t = s S t dt + s S t dz t . The risky asset S t has a drift s x > 0, and we assume that the returns on S t are perfectly correlated with percentage changes in demand shocks such that x s . 15 We use the traded assets B t and S t to de…ne a risk neutral measure, under which the demand shock X t follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift r and volatility x . 16 1 4 We can extend the model to incorporate a linear cost of capital pI ( 1) K as in neoclassical investment models, with pI > 0 as the purchase price of capital. For optimal investment timing, adding this cost operates as rede…ning …xed costs as e f K, with e f f + pI ( 1). Optimal capacity decisions would depend on the alternative marginal cost e cj = cjXt+ pI . 1 5 As in Carlson et al (2004) , this assumption does not a¤ect the qualitative implications of the model. 1 6 The dynamics of the demand shock under the risk neutral measure are dXt = (r ) Xt + xXtd b zt, where
In our model, all …rms sell their products at the common market price p t . At any point in time, the market price p t at which …rm j sells its production depends the capacity decisions of all its competitors. Whenever a competitor of …rm j invests, the market price p t goes down, and the current and expected future pro…ts of …rm j are also lower. We denote by jt the expected change in instantaneous pro…ts of …rm j due to investments by other …rms before …rm j invests. We denote by + jt the expected change in instantaneous pro…ts of …rm j due to investments by other …rms after …rm j invests.
Proposition 1 [Firm value under imperfect competition] The value of …rm j at time t for any investment strategy j = fx j ; j g is given by
where > 1 is de…ned in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (5) shows that V jt contains three components. The …rst is the value of a growing perpetuity of cash ‡ows generated by its assets in place. The second is the value of its investment opportunities or growth options. This provides the standard prediction in real options models that the value of the …rm depends on its lifestage. By considering V jt under imperfect competition, we obtain a third component which re ‡ects the impact of …rms'strategic interaction on their value. The investments of the competitor of …rm j a¤ect V jt through the expected reductions in future pro…ts denoted by jt and + jt , in (5). We characterize the signs and magnitudes of jt and + jt conditional on the equilibrium outcome in the next subsection.
We illustrate numerically how …rms'strategic interaction a¤ects their values in Figure 1 .
We simulate multiple paths of the Brownian demand shocks, we compute …rms'values using the de…nition in Proposition 1, and we report the average …rm value at each instant t. In Figure 1 , we consider the special case in which …rms invest sequentially such that …rm L invests earlier than …rm M (x L < x M ). 17 We observe that the value of each …rm goes above the value 1 7 A strategy in which xL < xM need not be an equilibrium outcome; other equilibria may exist where xL = xM or xL > xM . As we discuss in Section 1:3, there exists indeed an equilibrium outcome in which xL < xM , another in which xL = xM , and no equilibrium with xL > xM . Figure 1 actually uses the sequential equilibrium strategies s j described in Section 1:3. of its assets in place when its own growth option is in the money, and yet it goes below the value of its assets in place when its competitor is about to invest. This second e¤ect is entirely due to …rms'strategic interaction.
Equilibrium investment strategies 1.3.1 Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is Bayes-Nash. The state of the industry is described by the history of the stochastic demands shocks X t . At any point in time, a history is the collection of realizations of the stochastic process X s , s 6 t, and the actions taken by all …rms in the industry. The investment strategy j maps the set of histories of the industry into the set of actions fx j ; j g for …rm j. Before investment, …rm j responds immediately to its competitor's investment decision. This yields Nash equilibria in state dependent strategies of the closed-loop type. 18 Upon investment, …rm j cannot take any other action.
We follow Weeds (2002) and we assume that …rms follow Markov strategies such that their actions are functions of the current state X t only. As discussed in Weeds (2002) , other nonMarkov strategies may also exist; however, if one …rm follows a Markov strategy, the best response of the other …rm is also Markov. We consider the set of subgame perfect equilibria in which each …rm's investment strategy, conditional on its competitor's strategy, is value maximizing. A set of strategies that satis…es this condition is Markov perfect. The initial demand shock X 0 is su¢ ciently low to focus on equilibria in pure strategies. 19 Subgame perfection requires that each …rm's strategy maximizes its value conditional on its competitor's strategy.
Equilibrium outcome
We begin by stating the equilibrium outcome of the basic model; we elaborate on the corresponding solution approach and interpretation below. In a nutshell, there exist two alternative 1 8 A closed-loop equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in state-dependent strategies. See Chapter 13 of Fundenberg and Tirole (1991), Weeds (2002) and Back and Paulsen (2009) for related discussions on closed-loop strategies.
1 9 When …rms are identical, the equilibrium may involve mixed strategies, whose formulation is complicated by the continuous time nature of the game, as noted by Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Weeds (2002) . When …rms have di¤erent production technologies, however, Mason and Weeds (2010) shows that a su¢ cient condition to avoid these concerns is to assume that X0 is su¢ ciently low. Xo is assumed strictly lower than the lowest optimal investment threshold in the industry. Hence X0 < x industry equilibria in pure strategies: a sequential equilibrium and clustering equilibrium. We denote by s j the investment strategy of any …rm j in the sequential equilibrium with leaders and followers. We denote by c j the investment strategy of any …rm j in the clustering equilibrium in which …rms invest simultaneously.
The equilibrium outcome depends on the cross sectional di¤erences in …rms' production technologies. In a duopoly, these cross sectional di¤erences are summarized by the standard deviation of …rms'instantaneous marginal costs of production c
. We elaborate on the intra-industry value spread as a general measure of intra-industry heterogeneity in Section 2.
Proposition 2 [Investment under imperfect competition] The subgame perfect industry equi- where the threshold c is determined endogenously. 20
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 characterizes the two alternative subgame perfect equilibria which arise in our basic model. When c < c , …rms are close competitors with similar future costs of production; neither …rm has incentives to lead, and their market shares are similar upon investment. Furthermore, since both …rms invest simultaneously, we have that 
Solution approach
To solve for the equilibrium outcome, we use sorting conditions and incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs). The sorting conditions of the multiple action strategy fx j ; j g indicate which …rms in the industry have the comparative advantage to invest earlier and have a larger market share than their competitors. When …rms di¤er in their future costs of production c j , 2 0 We solve for c in subsection 1:3:3 below.
we prove in Appendix B that for any strategy more e¢ cient …rms …nd it less costly to invest earlier and more since
The sorting conditions in (6) have important implications for …rms' strategic behavior.
First, (6) implies that there are no sequential equilibria in which less e¢ cient …rm F invest earlier than the more e¢ cient …rm L. Since …rm L has a comparative advantage to invest earlier and more, …rm M does not become a leader in equilibrium even if it has incentives to preempt …rm L. Consequently, …rm L is the only potential leader when …rms invest sequentially. Second, the sorting conditions imply that …rms invest simultaneously when the more e¢ cient …rm has incentives to do so. If …rm L does not have an incentive to become a leader, neither does …rm M , whose ability to invest earlier and more is comparatively lower.
In equilibrium, we account for …rms'incentives to preempt each other using ICCs. Due to the di¤erences in …rms'production technologies, the sorting conditions in (6) show that more e¢ cient …rms with lower marginal costs of production c j …nd it less costly to invest earlier and more than their competitors. Yet less e¢ cient …rms may still want to invest as if they had lower future costs of production. In particular, …rm M has incentives to invest earlier and more than …rm L whenever its value as a leader is higher than its value as a follower.
To express this intuition more formally, we denote by V M is the value of …rm M in a Stackelberg game in which …rm L is the leader by assumption; and we denote by x L the investment threshold of …rm L in such Stackelberg game. We denote by g V M the value of the less e¢ cient …rm M when it deviates and pursues the optimal investment strategy of …rm L as a leader. 21 We conclude that …rm M has incentives to become a leader whenever
The inequality in (7) provides an upper bound c such that …rm M has no incentives to become a leader and preempt …rm L if c > c . When c > c ; the investment strategy of …rm L is that of a standard Stackelberg game in which …rm L always invests …rst. Conversely, when c < c , the inequality in (7) imposes a constraint to the maximization problem of …rm L, and the investment strategy of …rm L is a¤ected by the preemptive behaviour of …rm M .
Given (7), …rm M is indi¤erent between following the strategy of …rm L or following its own when its value is the same under the two alternative strategies. The corresponding complementary slackness condition is given by
where the multiplier in (8) relates to Posner (1975) , and measures to what extent the contest for monopoly power between …rms L and M hinders the value of …rm L. 22
Put together, the conditions in (6) and (7) imply that there are two di¤erent types of sequential equilibria. The exists one sequential equilibrium in which c < c and > 0; and there exists an alternative sequential equilibrium in which c > c and = 0. Since the focus of our paper is on the impact of strategic interaction on investment and expected returns, we assume for simplicity c is su¢ ciently low such that (7) holds throughout the paper. The sequential equilibrium in which = 0 has qualitatively the same properties of that in which
As a remark, we note that the impact of the assumption in (7) on the equilibrium outcome is captured through the multiplier > 0. The threshold c implied by (7) and the multiplier in (8) are mechanically related, and the economic intuition behind both concepts is the same.
c de…nes the threshold up to which …rm M has incentives to preempt …rm L; conversely, captures how costly it is for …rm L to deter the investments by …rm M . 23 We solve for the remaining threshold c in Proposition 2 by considering the incentives of …rm L to become a leader. Firm L may become a market leader, enjoy early monopoly rents and yet pay the shadow cost of preemption > 0. Alternatively, …rm L may allow the follower to invest simultaneously, attain lower duopoly rents from the start, and yet avoid any cost of preemption. Hence c is the threshold at which …rm L is indi¤erent between pursuing the
where (9) is evaluated at x s L since the …rm L invests earlier in the sequential equilibrium (i.e. x s L < x c ).
2 2 Due to the sorting conditions of the game in (6), the ICC of …rm M in (8) is binding as long as (7) holds.
The ICC of …rm L is not binding in equilibrium. 2 3 We provide the comparative statics of with respect to c in Figure 1 . We discuss the comparative statics of with respect to ", x , x and N in Section 2.
Discussion of the equilibrium outcome
We illustrate the main properties of the equilibrium outcome by means of numerical examples. Figure 2 shows the values of …rms L and F in equilibrium as a function of the parameter c :
In the upper left hand side panel, …rm L is more valuable in the clustering equilibrium when c < c , and that it is more valuable in the sequential equilibrium otherwise. In the upper right hand side panel, …rm M is more valuable under simultaneous investment for any c .
Hence the clustering equilibrium obtains when c < c , i.e. when both …rms strictly prefer to invest simultaneously. than under simultaneous investment ( c < c ). Also, the shadow cost of preemption for …rm L or is decreasing in c -i.e. it is less costly for …rm L to deter the investment of …rm M as c increases. Table 1 complements Figure 2 as it provides a numerical example of the sequential and simultaneous investment strategies for the same c . The purpose of Table 1 is two-fold.
First, since we consider all possible investment strategies for the same c , Table 1 compares the value of all …rms under each strategy for a given c and predict the equilibrium outcome.
In the example, the equilibrium outcome is such that all …rms invest simultaneously since c is relatively low.
Second, Table 1 illustrates how …rms'optimal investment strategies a¤ect their values for the same c . When …rms invest sequentially, …rm L behaves more aggressively, and invests earlier and more compared to Stackelberg games. 24 The binding ICC in (8) makes …rm L invest more aggressively to deter …rm M . Consistent with Figure 2 , Table 1 also shows that …rm L invests earlier in the sequential equilibrium than in the clustering equilibrium, while …rm M does the reverse.
Lastly, Table 1 shows how the magnitude and sign of the expected reduction in pro…ts jt depend on …rms' investment strategies in equilibrium. When c < c , …rms' invest simultaneously, for idle …rms in standard real options models. 25 Conversely, when c > c , …rms invest sequentially, and each …rm expects a reduction in its pro…ts when its competitor invests such that s jt 0. Table 1 compares such expected reductions in pro…ts jt at X t = X 0 .
Firms'betas
We study the impact of imperfect competition on …rms'expected returns by analyzing their exposure to systematic risk or betas. The conditional CAPM holds since …rms are subject to a single source of systematic risk. The source of systematic risk is given by the demand shock in (1). The riskless rate of return r is exogenously speci…ed, and the market price of risk is constant and exogenously given.
While several papers in the literature consider single factor models to explain the evidence on the cross section of returns 26 , Fama and French (1992) and subsequent papers show that …rms' betas are a poor measure of …rms' exposure to systematic risk, and that asset pricing models with multiple risk factors may have higher explanatory power. We address this concern empirically in Section 3, by testing our asset pricing predictions on both …rms' betas and returns.
We denote the beta of …rm j at time t by jt : To determine jt , we follow Carlson et al (2004) and infer expected returns from replicating portfolios composed of a risk free asset and a risky asset that exactly reproduce the dynamics of …rm value. The proportion of the risky asset held in the replicating portfolio at any time t yields jt :
Proposition 3 [Firms'betas under imperfect competition] For any strategy , the beta of …rm j at time t is given by
where I t is an indicator function which is equal to 0 if all …rms have invested at time t and is equal to 1 otherwise.
The identity in (10) for …rms'betas under imperfect competition resembles that in Carlson et al (2004) for monopolistic …rms. As in their paper, the exposure to systematic risk of any …rm j depends on the relative contribution of its own growth opportunities to total …rm value. Under imperfect competition, however, we add that jt also depends on the growth opportunities of other competing …rms in the industry.
The terms jt and V jt in (10) are a¤ected by …rms'strategic interaction in product markets.
Whenever one …rm in the industry invests, total production increases, the market price p t goes down, and there is a discrete change in the beta of all …rms in the industry. This explains why the indicator function I t in (10) equals zero only when all …rms in the industry have invested.
Industry risk dynamics
The remaining prediction of the basic model relates the dynamics of investment in Proposition 2 to the de…nition of …rms'betas in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 [Intra-industry correlation of betas] Given X t < x s M , the equilibrium dynamics of jt depend on c such that: if c < c , …rms' betas correlate positively; if c > c ; the betas of leaders and followers correlate negatively.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Consider …rst the dynamics of jt when c < c . When …rms are close competitors, they invest simultaneously, the value of each …rm is larger than the value of its assets in place before investment, and equal to the value of its assets in place thereafter. This implies that c jt is higher than one before investment and equal to one thereafter. This is illustrated numerically in the example of Table 1. More importantly, the dynamics of c jt are qualitatively the same as those that obtain in a real options model in which …rms do not invest strategically, such as Carlson et al (2004) . This holds because strategic interaction has no equilibrium e¤ects when …rms are close competitors (i.e. Consider now the dynamics of jt when c > c . When …rms are distant competitors, there are leaders and followers, and strategic interaction a¤ects the conditional dynamics of betas since …rms expect a reduction in their pro…ts once their competitors invest (i.e. s jt 6 0). When one …rm expects to increase its market share, the other expects a reduction in its own. We illustrate the equilibrium dynamics …rms' betas in Figure 3 . We simulate multiple paths of the Brownian demand shocks, compute …rms'betas using the de…nition in (10), and report the average …rm beta at each instant t. We consider the limit case in which c = c ; the limit case in which c = c highlights that even for the same set of parameters, and when all …rms in the industry are subject to the same systematic shock, the intra-industry correlation of betas depends on the dynamics of investment. The corresponding average intra-industry correlation in …rms'betas equals ' 0:9 when …rms invest simultaneously, and equals ' 0:9 when …rms invest sequentially. 27
Empirical Implications
We can reinterpret the results in Section 1 more generally in the context of neoclassical investment models. This gives us the core empirical implication that the intra-industry dynamics of investment and risk in imperfectly competitive industries are driven by the intra-industry value spread.
Investment and the intra-industry value spread
The benchmark neoclassical model by Hayashi (1982) predicts that the optimal investment of any …rm depends on its own marginal product of capital or q V K . When …rms behave strategically, we add that …rms with a higher marginal product of capital or q have the ability to invest earlier and more than their peers, and that the investment strategy of each …rm also depends on the intra-industry standard deviation in q.
These results hold not only in industries in which …rms di¤er in their marginal costs of production after investment c j , but also in industries in which …rms di¤er in their installed capacity before investment K j . Our choice of K j and c j as relevant sources of heterogeneity across …rms is both relevant and analytically convenient. The intra-industry heterogeneity in K j relates broadly to industries in which …rms di¤er in their assets in place. The intraindustry heterogeneity in c j relates broadly to industries in which …rms di¤er in their growth opportunities.
To state our results, we denote the intra-industry standard deviation in q at X t = X 0 by q;0 . We evaluate q at X t = X 0 below for the sake of simplicity; all we need is to compare …rms'marginal products of capital before …rms invest (i.e.X t < x s L ). We denote by q;0 the value of q;0 when …rm L is indi¤erent between becoming a leader or investing simultaneously with …rm F at (9).
Proposition 5 [q-theory of imperfect competition] Under imperfect competition, …rms'investment strategies are such that:
Proof. See Appendix E.
When …rms di¤er in K j or c j , the key …nding behind Proposition 3 is that the sorting conditions of the game can be restated such that …rms with higher q have the ability to invest earlier and more than their peers. To see this, consider …rst the special case of the basic model. When …rms di¤er exclusively in their marginal costs of production after investment c j , the more e¢ cient …rm has the ability to invest earlier and more. The marginal product of capital of any …rm j is strictly decreasing in c j . Consequently, for any strategy , …rms with a higher q at X t = X 0 have the ability to invest earlier and more. Table 1 illustrates that …rm L has the highest q at X t = X 0 .
As we show in Appendix E, a similar intuition holds when …rms di¤er exclusively in their installed capacity before investment such that …rm type is given by K j . In this case, …rms di¤er in the value of their assets in place and have the same growth option. The option to invest is relatively more valuable for the smaller …rms, and hence smaller …rms are willing to invest earlier and more. Given that the marginal product of capital q is strictly decreasing in K j , those …rms with a lower K j have a higher q, and have the ability to invest earlier and more.
We thus rede…ne …rm type in terms of …rms'q at X t = X 0 and characterize the equilibrium outcome as a function of the intra-industry standard deviation q;0 . When …rms di¤er in either K j or c j , we show formally in Appendix E that …rms invest simultaneously when q;0 < q;0 and sequentially otherwise. We also show in Appendix E that the same qualitative results of Proposition 3 hold when …rms di¤er in both in K j and c j ; also in this case, the sorting conditions of the game are such that …rms with high q have the ability to invest earlier and more.
Since …rms' marginal q is not observable, we restate Proposition 3 in terms of testable predictions by considering the identity between q and the market value to book ratio V K . For any strategy and X t < x j , it is straightforward to show that
The marginal q of …rm j in (11) consists of two terms. The …rst term equals the market to book ratio. The second term is consistent with Hayashi (1982) and captures the net present value of the marginal extraordinary income per unit of capital due to …rms'market power. 28 Given that the second term in (11) is common to all …rms in the same industry, the observable measure of the cross sectional variation in q within an industry is given by V K ;t q;t . We refer to V K ;t as the intra-industry value spread at time t.
Corollary 1 [Investment equations] Under imperfect competition, …rms'investment strategies
depend on their own market to book ratio, their current and future expected extraordinary pro…ts, and the intra-industry value spread.
The intra-industry value spread captures to what extent …rms' investment prospects are a¤ected by …rms'strategic interaction. A marginal increase in the capacity of …rm j does not only reduce the future market price for …rm j, as seen in the second term of (11); it also a¤ects the market share and market prices of all its competitors. As a result, Corollary 1 states that V K ;t is signi…cant in explaining investment. We provide the corresponding empirical evidence in Section 3.
Firms'betas and the intra-industry value spread
We can also reinterpret the predictions on …rms'betas in Section 1 to obtain the core testable implication of the model on industry risk dynamics and the intra-industry value spread.
Corollary 2 [Industry beta dynamics and value spread] Firms' betas correlate positively in industries with low value spread, and negatively in industries with high value spread.
In a related empirical study, Cohen et al (2003) show how the value spread of the entire cross section of US public …rms depends on the standard deviation in expected returns, and the standard deviation in …rms' pro…ts. We derive a similar identity for the intra-industry standard deviation of the logarithm of …rms' book to market ratios ln where t is de…ned in Appendix F, and t is the covariance between ln K V and ln K .
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 6 indicates that the intra-industry value spread is mechanically related to the cross section of expected returns and the cross sectional di¤erences in …rms'cash ‡ow to assets ratios. The fundamental di¤erence between (12) and the identity for the value spread in
Cohen et al (2003) is that our measure is purely intra-industry, and it is based on the premise that …rms'betas are interrelated under imperfect competition.
Cohen et al (2003) show that the value spread of US public …rms in multiple industries is mostly explained by the intra-industry cross sectional variation in returns, and the intraindustry cross sectional variation in …rms' earnings. This result is highly consistent with the predictions of our model. We argue that the intra-industry value spread determines the dynamics of …rms'investments and …rms'betas in equilibrium.
The …ndings in Cohen et al (2003) and the predictions of our model provide an empirical interpretation on the role of book to market sorts commonly used in the asset pricing literature. 29 Given that the value spread is predominantly intra-industry, market to book ratios re ‡ect the relative ability of one …rm to increase market share relative to its competitors.
Consequently, the book to market sorts typically used by asset pricers aggregate stocks into portfolios according to …rms'relative position in the industry.
A related and yet mechanical testable prediction is that industries with high value spread have higher intra-industry standard deviation in betas or returns. We …nd supporting empirical evidence on this in Section 3. Figure 3 shows that, even at the threshold c = c , the cross sectional variance of …rms'betas is higher in industries with leaders and followers.
Standard deviation in mark-ups and the HHI
While the intra-industry value spread is the key variable driving the dynamics of investment and betas, the model also yields testable implications based on commonly used measures of product market competition. We denote by m jt jt pt > 0 the mark-up in pro…ts of …rm j at time t.
When …rms only di¤er in c j , industries with leaders and followers are weakly more concentrated and have a weakly higher intra-industry standard deviation in mark-ups m;t than industries in which invest simultaneously. This is illustrated in Table 1 . By construction and when X t 6 x s L , m;t and the HHI of both industries is the same. Similarly, by construction, when the leader in the more heterogeneous industry invests at X t = x s L , it holds that s m;t and HHI s are higher than c m;t and HHI c thereafter. In contrast, when we allow …rms to di¤er in K j , the implied positive correlation between V K ;t , m;t and HHI need not hold. A deconcentrating industry may have a high value spread, and a concentrating industry may have a lower value spread. For instance, when …rms di¤er exclusively in K j , the smaller …rm …nds it more pro…table to invest earlier and more, and catches up in market share with the larger …rm upon investment. 30 Hence if the amount invested by leading small …rms is su¢ ciently large, the HHI of a deconcentrating industry with high value spread may be higher than the HHI of a deconcentrating industry with low value spread, before all …rms invest. 31 The corresponding empirical implication is that standard measures of competition such as m;t and the HHI may prove insu¢ cient to capture the degree of competition in an industry, since they are static. Firms'investment decisions depend not only on the current spread in mark-ups or market shares, but also on the expected future changes in mark-up and market shares. In contrast, the intra-industry value spread is an observable industry characteristic which captures the unobserved heterogeneity in …rms'production technologies over time.
We can only extrapolate the predictions on industry dynamics and the intra-industry value 
Predicting industry betas
Consistent with Carlson et al (2004) , …rms' betas increase before …rms exercise their own investment opportunity, and decrease upon investment. It need not follow, however, that the same dynamics apply to the average industry beta ;t . The stylized real options prediction that a …rm's beta increases before investment and decreases upon exercise only applies to ;t in industries with low value spread.
Corollary 3 [Predictability in industry betas] In industries with low value spread, periods of high market to book ratios, high investment and high betas are followed by periods of lower market to book ratios, lower investment and lower betas.
In industries with low value spread, average industry betas are more predictable, as a period of high market to book ratios, high investment, and high betas is followed by a period of lower market to book ratios, lower investment and lower betas. This pattern does not hold in industries with high value spread, in which the dynamics of the average industry beta are not representative of the dynamics of the beta of each …rm in the industry.
A related testable implication is that average industry expected returns should be more predictable in less concentrated industries, unless these industries are undergoing deep transitions from high to low competition or viceversa. This is consistent with the evidence in Hoberg and Phillips (2010), who …nd that in less concentrated industries periods of high market to book ratios, high returns, high betas and high investment, are followed by periods of lower market to book ratios, lower investment, lower returns and lower betas. 32 They also …nd no predictable pattern in the average industry returns of industries with high HHI.
Inter-industry implications
In Section 1, we keep all exogenous parameters related to the industrial organization constant except for c . As a result, our focus is on how the intra-industry cross sectional variation in …rms'technologies a¤ects the industry dynamics of investment and risk. In practice however, industries di¤er in multiple characteristics which also in ‡uence these dynamics. We hereby explore how inter-industry di¤erences in the demand growth x , demand volatility x , demand elasticity ", and the number of …rms N a¤ect our main empirical implications.
Product Market Demand
The dynamics of investment and expected returns in Section 1 depend critically on the threshold c . Figure 4 shows that c is decreasing in "; and increasing in demand growth x and volatility x . The rationale behind these results is consistent with previous studies. Ivaldi et al (2003) show that tacit coordination is more likely in growing industries, in which current pro…ts are low relative to future pro…ts. Boyer et al (2001) suggest that demand uncertainty induces coordination as it boosts the growth option values of all …rms. Similarly, Ivaldi et al (2003) and Motta (2004) argue that coordination is more likely with low demand elasticity. is increasing in x and x ; since x and x boosts the growth option value of all …rms, leaders …nd it more costly to deter the investments of their competitors in industries with high demand growth and high demand volatility. is decreasing in "; since an increase in " implies a reduction in the market power of …rm M , leadership is relatively less costly for …rm L as " increases.
The corresponding empirical implication is that in industries with low demand elasticity ", high demand growth x , and high demand volatility x …rms have more similar investment patterns, …rms' betas correlate more positively, and the average industry beta is more predictable. Furthermore, the insight that a …rm's beta is mainly a¤ected by its own investment decisions is incomplete in industries with high demand elasticity ", low demand growth x , and low demand volatility x .
The comparative statics of c with respect to ", x and x also have an important indirect empirical implication. Firms' investment strategies and betas correlate more positively in industries with low value spread not only when we compare industries with a di¤erent c (as in Proposition 2), but also when we compare heterogeneous industries with di¤erences in ";
x and x . The practical implication of the comparative statics in Figure 4 is yet that we need not control for di¤erences across industries in ", x and x when assess empirically if the intra-industry correlation in …rms'betas is higher in industries with low value spread. This is relevant for the sake of empirical tests in Section 3.
To see this, note that the threshold c is decreasing in "; industries are more likely to have leaders and followers as " increases. By construction, and all else equal, the intra-industry value spread is higher under sequential investment. Hence our prediction of more comovement in betas in industries with low value spread holds for industries with di¤erent demand elasticities ". Likewise, the threshold c is increasing in x and x ; industries are less likely to have leaders and followers as x and x increase. Hence our prediction of more comovement in betas in industries with low value spread also holds for industries with di¤erences in x and x .
Industries with N > 2 …rms
While we focus on a model with N = 2 …rms, in practice industries need not be duopolies.
By construction, a higher number of …rms increases the set of potential industry equilibria.
When N > 2, some …rms may invest sequentially, while some others may …nd it optimal to cluster instead.
The approach to solve the game is the same as in Section 1, and relies on sorting conditions and ICCs. As in Cho and Sobel (1990) , the sorting conditions are the same for any value of N , and hence also in oligopolies …rms with higher q have the ability to invest earlier and more.
Furthermore, the sorting conditions facilitate the analysis when N > 2, insofar they constrain the set of possible equilibria to those in which …rms with high q invest earlier or in tandem with …rms with lower q.
Given that the sorting conditions of the game are the same, the core testable prediction for duopolies that …rms'investment patterns are more similar in industries with low value spread also holds when N > 2: In oligopolies, …rms decide when and how much to invest based on the di¤erence between their market to book ratio and that of their competitors. Hence when …rms have more similar market to book ratios, …rms have more similar investment patterns, and the intra-industry comovement in …rms'betas is higher.
As we discuss in Appendix G, however, while the intra-industry value spread is still key in determining the equilibrium outcome with N > 2 , in oligopolies the entire distribution of …rms' market to book ratios is necessary to characterize the equilibrium. Intuitively, in an industry with N …rms, the intra-industry value spread captures how distant each …rm is from the average …rm in the industry. In the model, however, each …rm is e¤ectively constrained by the behavior of their closest competitor. Consequently, if the distribution of …rms'market to book ratios is fairly skewed, the equilibrium outcome may combine early investments by leaders with late, clustered investments by laggards.
We illustrate these arguments by means of an example with three …rms. We label …rms by L, M and F , where …rm F can be interpreted as a single …rm or more broadly as a fringe of …rms with very similar costs of production whose investments cluster in equilibrium. We assume that …rms have the same installed capacity K before investment, and have uniformly distributed marginal costs of production after investment such that c L < c M < c F . We report all potential equilibria in pure strategies in Tables 2 and 3 . Firms may invest sequentially or simultaneously as in the duopoly case (Table 2) . Furthermore, two of the three …rms may cluster, and the remaining …rm may either lead or follow (Table 3 ). Tables 2 and 3 provides several important insights. Consistent with our …ndings as in Section 1, we observe that since the intra-industry value spread is relatively low, the three …rms optimally invest simultaneously (Table 2) . Also, since the model has a single stochastic shock, the instantaneous correlation between the betas of any pair of …rms is either 1 or 1. However, the average intra-industry correlation in …rms'betas over time is a¤ected by N .
The example in
To see this, we use the parametrization in the numerical example of Table 2 , we compute …rms' betas over time using simulated Brownian paths, and we compute the average intraindustry correlation in …rms'betas in the fully sequential equilibrium with N = 3 and x L < x M < x F . We compare our results to those in the fully sequential equilibrium for N = 2 depicted in Figure 3 . When N = 2, the average intra-industry correlation in …rms' betas equals ' 0:9. When N = 3, the average intra-industry correlation in …rms'betas is ' 0:32.
The absolute average intra-industry correlation is lower when N = 3, since the betas of two non-investing …rms are always positively correlated over time. 33 The numerical example also illustrates how a higher number of …rms N a¤ects …rms' investment strategies and betas. For this sake, we compare our numerical examples for N = 2 in Table 1 and N = 3 in Table 2 . Consistent with Grenadier (2002) Table 2 at X t = X 0 is lower than the corresponding beta of …rm M at X t = X 0 in Panel (C) of Table 1 .
We also …nd that an increase in N need not induce all …rms to accelerate investment. In Grenadier (2002) and in the industries with low value spread in this paper, …rms optimally invest earlier and less as N increases. However, in industries with high value spread, an increase in N may induce …rms with high q to invest earlier and more to preserve their position as leaders, forcing …rms with lower q to delay their investment. In Tables 1 and 2 , and when …rms invest sequentially (Panels B and A, respectively), …rm L invests earlier when N = 3; conversely, …rm M invests earlier when N = 2. 34
Empirical evidence
Sections 2 provides qualitative testable implications on how …rms'strategic interaction a¤ect the intra-industry dynamics of investments and betas. A reasonable concern, however, is whether these e¤ects are economically signi…cant. Given the nature of the problem of study, it is reasonable to argue that strategic interaction plays a bigger role in determining the dynamics of investment and risk in some industries and not in others.
A natural experiment to tackle this concern would be to calibrate the model to match the investment and risk dynamics of di¤erent industries. Complicating the task of calibration, however, the parameters which characterize the organization of an industry in our model are empirically unobservable, or require at least a thorough empirical study to infer their magnitude. These parameters include …rms' marginal costs of production, …rms' costs of investment, and the underlying determinants of product market demand ", x , and x .
We pursue an alternative approach and assess whether the main testable predictions of our model hold on average for the cross section of US industries. Our tests rely on similar datasets used in previous studies such as Hou and Robinson (2006) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) .
Our empirical tests provide supporting empirical evidence on the following predictions:
Firms'investment strategies are signi…cantly related to the intra-industry value spread;
Firms'betas and returns correlate more positively in industries with low intra-industry value spread; and Firms'betas and returns correlate more positively in industries with low intra-industry standard deviation in mark-ups, and low HHI.
Dataset and empirical approach
We de…ne an industry by its four-digit SIC code. This is the …nest available industry classi…-cation that is available in our merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT dataset. We prefer such measure as opposed to a broader industry de…nition since our testable predictions rely on the impact of …rms'strategic interaction in product markets.
We include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ-listed …rms in the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns …le and the COMPUSTAT annual …le between January 1968 and December 2008. We use data at annual frequency to run the tests on investment equations. We use data at monthly frequency to run the asset pricing tests. We elaborate on the database construction in Appendix H. We report the summary statistics of the working sample in Table 4 .
We denote the relevant variables in our tests as the equity beta ; the excess return or stock return in excess of the risk free rate R; the market to book asset ratio V K ; the book leverage ratio B K ; the market to book equity ratio V B K B ; the cash ‡ow to assets ratio K ; the investment rate I K ; and the mark-up in pro…ts m. We follow Khanna and Thomas (2009) and construct a measure of comovement which captures the average pairwise correlation in …rms'investments, market to book equity ratios, market to book asset ratios, betas and excess returns by industry. We denote the intra-industry comovement of variable x in month-year t as ! x;t .
We also consider the two static measures of competition discussed in Section 1. One is the intra-industry deviation in mark-ups or m;t , which we construct using the COMPUSTAT annual …les. The other is the logarithm of the HHI index by four-digit SIC code reported by the US Census Bureau or lnHHI, which is limited to manufacturing industries only. 35 In line 3 5 We use logs for scaling purposes only; results are qualitatively the same when we use the HHI.
with Ali et al (2009), we do not compute the HHI using CRSP-COMPUSTAT sales data since such index is not highly correlated with the US Census Bureau concentration index. 36 We apply the same empirical methodology to test all our implications on investment and risk. Given that in our model the underlying industry determinants of demand and the number of …rms are constant, we run all tests using cross sectional regressions as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) . To account for serial correlation, we consider Newey West standard errors. 37 Finally, the model assumes that …rms are unlevered, while most …rms in our working sample are levered. We thus run our tests on (equity) betas and stock returns using two alternative de…nitions of the intra-industry value spread: one based on the asset value spread or V K ;t , and another based on the equity value spread V B K B ;t .
Investment, betas and returns
The core asset pricing prediction that the …rm's betas comove more positively in industries with low value spread relies on three important results in the model. The …rst is that …rms' investments relate signi…cantly to the intra-industry value spread. We provide the corresponding empirical evidence in Table 5 . We …nd that the intra-industry value spread is signi…cant in explaining investment, both at the …rm level (Panels B and C) and industry level (Panel E and F) . We obtain similar results when using the intra-industry asset value spread (Panels B and E), and the intra-industry equity value spread (Panels C and F).
The second result is that …rms'investment decisions a¤ect their exposure to systematic risk.
We provide the supporting empirical evidence of this result in Panels A to F of Table 6 , by showing that the intra-industry comovement in betas and excess returns are signi…cantly related to the intra-industry comovement in investment. Similarly, the intra-industry comovement in betas and excess returns are signi…cantly related to the intra-industry comovement in market to book ratios.
Finally, the predictions of our single factor model apply to both betas and excess returns.
Like other papers, we acknowledge that our single factor model does not explain why there exist value and size premia in excess returns. However, both in the model and in the data, the 3 6 In untabulated tests, we also consider the proxy of the HHI recently proposed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) .
While we obtain similar results, the industry de…nition of their proxy is noisy for the sake of our study, as it relies on 3-digit SIC codes.
3 7 We have also run all empirical tests in this section using OLS regressions with year dummies. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
intra-industry comovement in betas is signi…cantly related to the intra-industry comovement in excess returns. The average R-square in Panel G of Table 6 indicates that the intra-industry comovement in betas explains on average 37% of the intra-industry comovement in excess returns. 38
Industry risk dynamics and product markets
The model predicts a negative and signi…cant correlation between the intra-industry comovement in betas and excess returns and the intra-industry value spread. Table 7 provides the corresponding empirical evidence. We …nd a negative and signi…cant correlation between the intra-industry comovement in betas and the intra-industry value spread (Panels A and B). We also …nd a negative and signi…cant relation between the intra-industry comovement in excess returns and the intra-industry value spread (Panels E and F).
The model further suggests that those industries with low value spread may also have low standard deviation in mark-ups, and low HHI; this holds when the intra-industry value spread is positively correlated with the intra-industry standard deviation in mark-ups, and with the HHI. In our dataset, we observe a signi…cant and positive correlation between the intra-industry asset value spread, the equity value spread, the standard deviation in mark-ups, and the log of the HHI. The pairwise correlation between the asset (equity) value spread and the dispersion in mark-ups is 17:55% (resp. 19:73%). The pairwise correlation between the asset (equity) value spread and the logarithm of the HHI is 16:51% (resp. 16:46%).
The corresponding testable implication is that of a negative and signi…cant correlation between these static measures of competition and the intra-industry comovement in betas or excess returns. As suggested by the model, we report in Table 7 a negative and signi…cant relation between the comovement in betas, and the static measures of competition given by m;t and lnHHI (Panels C and D). We also …nd a negative and signi…cant relation between the comovement in excess returns, and the static measures of competition given by m;t and lnHHI (Panels G and H). Using an alternative empirical approach, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) also show that returns comove more positively in industries with low HHI.
Conclusion
This paper provides a model of industry equilibrium to study how strategic interaction a¤ects the intra-industry dynamics of corporate investment and expected returns. Under imperfect competition, the fundamental insight in the asset pricing literature that a …rms'exposure to systematic risk or beta is a¤ected by its own investment decisions is incomplete. In industries with high value spread, low demand growth, low demand volatility, and high demand elasticity, a …rm's beta is sometimes better explained by the investment of its peers.
In imperfectly competitive industries, we predict that the investment strategy and exposure to systematic risk of each …rm is a¤ected by marginal product of capital of all its competitors; this suggests why the value spread in Cohen et al (2003) is predominantly intra-industry. We …nd theoretically and empirically that …rms'betas and excess returns correlate more positively in industries with low value spread. We also document and explain why …rms'betas and excess returns correlate more positively in industries why low HHI, and low intra-industry standard deviation in mark-ups.
To conclude, we highlight that the fundamental insight of our paper is that product markets have non trivial e¤ects on …rms' investment decisions and their expected returns. In this context, dynamic models of strategic interaction typically studied in the industrial organization literature become a useful tool to explain empirical regularities in the cross section of returns.
The model can be extended in many ways.
Appendix

A Proposition 1
For any strategy j = fxj; j g, we denote A jt = j + j the value of the assets in place of …rm j before investment, A
the value of the assets in place of …rm j after investment. At the investment threshold Xt = xj, the …rm can pay f K to increase the value of its assets in place from A jt to A + jt . Given exercise at Xt > xj, the value of the growth option to invest is calculated as a perpetual binary option with payo¤ V
f K. We then observe 3 9 that the expected value of the growth option to invest is given by
, where
is the price of a contingent claim that pays 1 if the …rm invests and 0 otherwise, and the parameter > 1 is such that For any strategy j = fxj; j g, we conclude that Vjt equals A jt + Gjt if Xt < xj, and A + jt if Xt > xj.
B Proposition 2
B.1. Sorting conditions
The strategy pursued by …rms is a multiple-action pair such that j = fxj; j g: The proof of the sorting conditions on j follows Bustamante (2012) and consists of two steps. The …rst step is to show that if the value function Vjt complies the conditions in Cho and Sobel (1990) , then the sorting condition of the action pair j corresponds to the sorting conditions of each action in isolation. The second step is to derive the sorting conditions of xj and j separately. j is equal to the market price pt when jt = 0; we use a more general notation since the sorting conditions should hold for any strategy j . In the basic model, the value function Vjt …rm j given the set of actions j is such that
We consider the case of N = 2 in which Kj = K and cL < cM . In line with Cho and Sobel (1990) , Vjt is continuous in j and for any type j: Furthermore, if xL < xM and L > M ; then it must be the case that VMt e VMt implies VLt > e VLt. This last condition ensures that if …rm M has incentives to deviate, …rm L will pay a cost to ensure incentive compatibility. Denote d =
x L x M < 1. We also denote by e Yj;i the expected production of the industry when …rm j deviates and pretends to be …rm i. Then the condition VMt e VMt implies cM c where c is given by
Similarly, the condition VLt > e VLt implies cL c: Therefore if cL < cM and cM c; it holds that cL < c for any parameter value.
Consider now the sorting condition for each action xj and j separately. The sorting conditions re ‡ect that, all else equal, more e¢ cient …rms …nd it less costly to invest earlier and more, namely
Put together, these inequalities ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint of …rm M is binding and that there exists a sequential equilibrium when N = 2.
The sorting conditions described for N = 2 also apply for the more general case of N > 2. This is because the su¢ ciency conditions in Cho and Sobel (1990) apply for games with N types. All conditions above hold when cL < ::: < cj < ::::cN :
B.2. Sequential equilibrium
In the sequential equilibrium, the manager of …rm j chooses the strategy 
For the sake of convenience, we also use the notation in Appendix A, and we denote A 
Consider now the optimization problem of …rm L. The optimality conditions of …rm L are di¤erent from those of …rm F since in the sequential equilibrium …rm L is subject to the complementary slackness condition in (8). We solve for s L using Kuhn-Tucker. The value function of the manager of …rm
and the corresponding optimality conditions are given by
where the Lagrange multiplier > 0 due to the sorting conditions of the game. The optimal threshold x s L is given by
B.3. Clustering equilibrium
We denote the value of …rm j in the clustering equilibrium as V To obtain the optimal equilibrium strategies of …rms in the clustering equilibrium, the proof consists of two steps. First, we show that the Markov-perfect clustering equilibrium is such that both …rms are better o¤ by investing simultaneously. This is consistent with Fundenberg and Tirole (1985) and Weeds (2002) . Second, we derive the optimal investment threshold x c and the increases in capacity j in the clustering equilibrium.
In our model, both …rms are better o¤ by investing simultaneously when the value of …rm L is higher under the investment strategies c j . The sorting conditions of the game in Appendix B on VLt and VMt imply that all …rms have incentives to invest simultaneously when …rm L has incentives to do so. If …rm L does not have an incentive to invest sequentially, neither does …rm M , whose ability to invest earlier and more is comparatively lower. As a result, the clustering equilibrium obtains when …rm L does not exercise its option to become a leader.
The equilibrium investment timing x c is such that it maximizes the value of …rm L, and the corresponding optimality conditions is such that the derivative of G c Lt with respect to x c equals zero for all values of Xt:
Given the asymmetry in …rms'production technologies, each …rm would attain its maximum value by clustering at investment thresholds. A priori, this might lead to a range of potential equilibrium thresholds x c . The lowest threshold x c would correspond to that of the more e¢ cient …rm L; conversely, the upper bound x c would correspond to the optimal threshold for the less e¢ cient …rm M . However, …rm L has no incentives to wait further than its own optimal threshold x c : Meanwhile, …rm M still has incentives to invest at x c not to become a follower. As a result, the equilibrium threshold x c maximizes the value of …rm L such that
The optimal scale c j > 1 that maximizes the assets in place A c+ jt of each …rm j equals
The derivation of jt follows that in Carlson et al (2004) . Applying Ito's lemma to V , we note that the exposure to systematic risk of the …rm equals the proportion of the replicating portfolio invested in the risky asset, such that = xVx V
. The exact expression for jt depends on the equilibrium outcome. If c 6 c, c jt equals
; and is equal to 1 otherwise, where
; and is equal to 1 otherwise.
D Proposition 4
The sign of the covariance between the beta of …rm L and that of …rm M depends on c. For any investment strategy , the de…nition of …rms' betas in (10) implies that the covariance in …rms' betas depends on the covariance in …rms'cash ‡ow to value ratios, and hence
When c 6 c, both …rms expect an increase in value upon investment, and c j;t = c+ jt = 0: This implies that, before investment, Vjt jt = Gjt, where Gjt is the value of the growth option of …rm j, and
where we de…ne j > 0 such that
Conversely, when c > c, each …rm expects a reduction in its pro…ts upon the investment of its competitor, where s M;t < 0 and s+ L;t < 0. Consider …rst the interval x s L < Xt < x s M . In this case, …rm L only expects a reduction in its pro…ts, while …rm M only expects an increase in its pro…ts upon investment. As a result, 
E Proposition 5
We de…ne a scalar qj such that qj is the marginal product of capital of …rm j, evaluated at Xt = X0 and some strategy = fx; g. For any strategy = fx; g, the marginal product of capital q equals (11). The choice of the strategy to de…ne qj is without loss of generality; we use the same for all …rms and do not a¤ect the sorting of qj. Similarly, we use X0 for the sake of simplicity; any Xt 6 x s L is suitable to de…ne qj. In all cases, the su¢ ciency conditions described for N = 2 also apply for N > 2.
E.1. Sorting conditions
We derive the sorting conditions with respect to qj for three di¤erence cases: one in which …rms di¤er only in cj, another in which …rms only di¤er on Kj, and then when …rms di¤er both in Kj and cj.
Firms di¤er in c j The sorting conditions with respect to cj are provided in (6) and derived in Appendix B. Equation (11) implies that for any investment strategy VK is a monotone, strictly decreasing function of cj; hence …rms with higher marginal costs of production are willing to invest less. Put together, we get that …rms with higher qj have the ability to invest earlier and more, namely
Firms di¤er in K j When KL < KM and cj = c, the functional form of Vjt is the same as in Appendix B.
We …rst prove that if xL < xM and L > M ; then VMt e VMt implies VLt > e VLt. 
, it holds that c < c (KL) for any parameter value. The expressions for the marginal sorting conditions on xj and j with respect to Kj are not as simple as those with respect to cj in Appendix B. As a result, we set additional assumptions to ensure that the corresponding sorting conditions always have the same sign. To ease on exposition, we …rst provide their expression and required sign; we then consider su¢ cient conditions under which the indicated sign holds for any investment strategy. The economic rationale behind the sorting conditions with respect to Kj relates to the study by Boyer et al (2001) .
We denote the market share of …rm j before investment by s j
, and upon investment by s
All else equal, …rms with more Kj wait longer to invest, namely
This sorting condition shows that the net gain from investing in capital for …rm j is decreasing in Kj. Since the relative gain from investing is larger for smaller …rms, smaller …rms are willing to invest earlier. A su¢ cient yet not necessary assumption such that this sorting condition is always positive is that the net decrease in marginal costs upon investment c c < 0 is relatively large.
All else equal, …rms with less Kj are willing to invest more, namely
This sorting condition implies that the marginal product of capital of any …rm is decreasing in Kj. When there are decreasing returns to scale, smaller …rms are willing to invest more than larger …rms. A su¢ cient yet not necessary assumption such that this sorting condition holds is that the elasticity of demand " > 1 is relatively low. The positive relation between returns to scale and demand elasticity is discussed in neoclassical investment papers such as Hayashi (1982) Given the sorting conditions, VK is a monotone strictly decreasing function in Kj such that VKK < 0. Hence …rms with higher qj have the ability to invest earlier and more, namely
Firms di¤er in K j and c j Firms with lower installed capacity before investment Kj and lower costs of production after investment cj have the ability to invest earlier and more. To see this, we …rst show that if xL < xM and L > M ; then VMt e VMt implies VLt > e VLt. The condition VMt e VMt implies cM c (KM ). The condition VLt > e VLt implies cL c (KL) : Since DK < 0 and also KL < KM , we know that c (KM ) < c (KL). Therefore if cL < cM , KL < KM , cM c (KM ) < c (KL) it holds that cL < c (KL).
We use our previous results on the marginal sorting conditions on xj and j to show that, when …rms di¤er in Kj and cj, the corresponding marginal sorting conditions are given by
The pair which determines …rm type fKj; cjg can restated in terms of …rms' marginal product of capital q VK in (11). The sorting conditions with respect to Kj ensure that VK is strictly decreasing in the capacity of …rms such that VKK < 0. The sorting conditions on cj also imply that VK is strictly decreasing in cj: …rms with higher marginal costs of production are willing to invest less. Consequently, …rms with more Kj and higher cj have a lower q before investment, for any strategy : Furthermore, using our previous results, we get that
E.2. Equilibrium outcome
When …rms di¤er in cj only as in Section 1, we derive …rms'investment strategies in equilibrium as in Appendix B. We get the investment threshold c at which …rm L is indi¤erent between investing simultaneously or sequentially using (9). The threshold q;0 is given by the function q;0 when c equals c. Since qj is a monotone strictly decreasing function in cj, we restate the equilibrium outcome derived in Appendix B in terms of qj. We solve for the equilibrium strategies when …rms di¤er in Kj only in the same way, since qj is a monotone strictly decreasing function in Kj.
When …rms di¤er in both Kj and cj, the sorting conditions show that …rms with higher qj have the ability to invest earlier and more, and hence the qualitative predictions of the basic model also apply here. Denote by K the standard deviation in …rms'installed capacitites before investment. There exist multiple combinations of the pairs of c and K such that (9) is satis…ed. Hence there exists a range of values of q;0 such that (9) is sati…ed. We obtain a clustering equilibrium when q;0 is su¢ ciently low (i.e. c or K are su¢ ciently low), and obtain a sequential equilibrium if q;0 is su¢ ciently high (i.e. c or K are very high). Yet with multiple sources of heterogeneity there is no unique correspondence between (9) and q;0.
F Proposition 6
We apply the variance operator to jt in (10) such that The property that var (g (y)) [g 0 (E (y))] 2 var (y) follows the derivation of the delta method in Greene 
G The case of N > 2 …rms
The solution approach for N > 2 relies on sorting conditions and ICCs just at the case of N = 2. In oligopolies, the use of sorting conditions facilitates the analysis, insofar they constrain the set of possible equilibria to those in which …rms with higher marginal q invest earlier or in tandem with other …rms. Just as signalling games with multiple discrete types, 4 0 each …rm cares about its closest and strongest competitor. Consequently, if …rm j invests earlier and more than its closest competitor …rm i in equilibrium, the only binding ICC for …rm j is that of …rm i.
To illustrate the main properties of the case of N > 2, we consider an the extension of the basic model with N = 3 …rms. We assume that …rms have the same installed capacity before investment, and they have heterogeneous marginal costs of production upon investment. The sorting conditions of the game are the same for any value of N , and hence they are equal to those in Appendix B. We label …rms by L, M and F . We assume cL < cM < cF , cL = cM a, cF = cM + b, a > 0, and b > 0. Given this notation, cM is the average marginal cost of production upon investment, and c q a 2 +b 2 3
is the standard deviation in …rms' marginal costs of production.
The key departure of the case of N > 2 relative to the case of N = 2 is that …rms'strategies in equilibrium cannot be characterized uniquely in terms of c. In the example with N = 3, the parameters a and b are both necessary to determine the equilibrium outcome of the game. More intuitively, this implies that higher order moments of the distribution of cj also matter-i.e. the skewness of …rms' marginal costs of production. An important exception is the case in which cj is uniformly distributed such that a = b, and c q 2 3 a: Just as in Proposition 2, however, even if a and b are di¤erent, …rms'investments are more clustered in equilibrium if a and b are relatively small (i.e. low c). Table 2 illustrates an example with N = 3 in which c is small and the equilibrium outcome is that all …rms invest at the common investment threshold x c :
Put di¤erently, the equilibrium outcome of the game with N = 3 depends on the ability of both …rm L and M to invest earlier than their closest competitor. Even if …rm L may …nd it more convenient to invest earlier than …rm M , the strategy of …rm M also depends on the preemptive behavior of …rm F . For instance, if …rms M and F are close competitors (i.e. b > 0 is relatively small), …rm M may …nd it too costly to invest earlier than …rm F . This, in turn, may constrain the ability of …rm L to invest earlier than …rms M and F (i.e if. a > 0 is not su¢ ciently large).
Consider now the more general case in which …rms di¤er in their production technologies before and after investment. Just as in Proposition 3, the more general testable implication of the model for the case of N > 2 …rms is that …rms'investment dynamics are more similar in industries with low value spread. We can extend the insight in Proposition 3 to the case of N > 2 …rms since the sorting conditions in Appendix D apply for any number of …rms N .
H Database construction
The working sample is drawn from a merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database from 1968 to 2008. We estimate the beta of each …rm as the sum of the coe¢ cients of monthly returns on lagged, lead and contemporary market returns of the stock return of each …rm in the sample. We compute betas at a monthly frequency, using …ve-year rolling windows containing the previous 60 observations. We compute stock returns in excess of the risk free rate reported in CRSP.
We estimate betas as the sum of the coe¢ cients of monthly returns on lagged, lead and contemporary market returns of the stock return of each …rm in the sample. We compute betas at a monthly frequency. We follow Fama and French (1992) and match each …rm's CRSP stock return and betas from July of year t until June of year t + 1 to the corresponding accounting information in COMPUSTAT for the …scal year ending in year t 1: With the exception of lnHHI, we construct the remaining explanatory variables using COMPUSTAT tapes. lnHHI is the logarithm of the HHI for manufacturing industries reported by the US Census Bureau; since the HHI is reported every …ve years, we repeat the HHI of year t over the next four years for every industry.
The market value of equity is the product of item PRCC_F times CSHO. The market value of assets V is the market value of equity plus total liabilities. The total liabilities B are computed as AT minus CEQ minus TXDB. Operating cash ‡ows are the sum of SALE minus COGS minus XSGA. Investment I ( 1) K is CAPX. We consider K to be total assets AT, with the exception of
where K is set as lagged PPENT. The operating mark-up m is the ratio of over SALE. All COMPUSTAT variables are winsorized at 1%:
We construct the intra-industry comovement in variable x at time t or !x;t as in Khanna and Thomas (2009) where Cov (i; j) is the covariance between the variable x of …rms i and j during the window between month t and month t 60, V ar(i) is the variance of …rm i's variable x in such window, and V ar(j) is the variance of …rm j's monthly variable x. To compute the comovement in the ratios
, we compute the market value of equity at a monthly frequency, using the time series of PRCC and CSHO reported in CRSP.
I Parameter choice in numerical examples
The parameters in Tables 1-3 This table illustrates the potential industry equilibria when N = 2 and …rms di¤er in their future production technologies. The investment strategy fxj; j g consists of the demand threshold at which …rm j invests xj, and the scale of the …rm j > 1 upon investment. The superscript s corresponds to sequential strategies; the superscript c corresponds to clustering strategies.
is the multiplier of the ICC of …rm L. j;0 is the expected reduction in future pro…ts of …rm j before other …rms invest, evaluated at Xt = X0. qj;0 is the marginal product of capital of …rm j at Xt = X0. HHI is the Her…ndahl-Hirshman Index. m is the standard deviation in the operating mark-ups. The outcome is the clustering equilibrium in Panel (C). These tables illustrate the potential equilibrium outcomes with N = 3 when …rms have the same parameters as those in Table 1 . The investment strategy fxj; j g consists of the demand threshold at which …rm j invests xj, and the scale of …rm j j > 1 after investment. The superscript s corresponds to sequential investment; the superscript c corresponds to clustered investment. j is the multiplier of the binding ICC on …rm j. j;0 is the expected reduction in pro…ts of …rm j before other …rms invest, evaluated at Xt = X0. The outcome is the clustering equilibrium in Panel (B) of Table 2 . is the equity beta; R is the excess stock return, which is annualized in this table since all statistics are reported in annual terms; V K is the market to book asset ratio;
V B K B
is the market to book equity ratio; B K is the book leverage ratio; K is operating cash ‡ows to assets; m is the operating mark-up on pro…ts; x denotes the intra-industry standard deviation in variable x; lnHHI is the logarithm of the US Census HHI; and !x denotes the intra-industry comovement in variable x. The details on database construction are provided in Appendix H. is the market to book equity ratio; K is operating pro…ts to assets; and x denotes the intra-industry standard deviation in variable x. Newey-West corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0:01, **p < 0:05 and *p < 0:1. is the market to book equity ratio; and V K is the market to book asset ratio. Newey-West corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0:01, **p < 0:05 and *p < 0:1. Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on comovement measures as a function of the intra-industry value spread and static measures of competition. The data used is in monthly frequency. !x denotes the intra-industry comovement in variable x; is the equity beta; R is the excess stock return; V K is the market to book asset ratio; V B K B is the market to book equity ratio; m is the mark-up on operating pro…ts; and lnHHI is the logarithm of the US Census HHI. Newey-West corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0:01, **p < 0:05 and *p < 0:1. Figure 1 . This …gure illustrates how …rms'strategic interaction a¤ect their values for the special case in which …rm L invests earlier than …rm M such that xL < xM . The total value of any …rm consists of its assets in place, its growth options, and the expected reduction in future pro…ts due to investments by its competitors. Figure 2: This …gure illustrates how the intra-industry standard deviation in costs of production c a¤ects …rms'investment strategies in equilibrium. The red color relates to the sequential strategies s j ; the blue color relates to the clustering strategies c j . The black dotted line re ‡ects …rms'investment strategies in equilibrium. Vj is the value of …rm j; xj is the demand threshold at which …rms invest; is the multiplier of the ICC of …rm j; sL is the market share of …rm L when all …rms have invested. c is expressed in %. Demand growth x Figure 4 . This …gure illustrates how the underlying determinants of market demand a¤ect the threshold c and the shadow cost of preemption . The threshold c is the minimum value of the intra-industry standard deviation in …rms' costs of production c at which …rm L prefers to cluster.
is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint of …rm M under sequential investment.
